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The Effects of the Louisiana Scholarship Program on
Student Achievement after Two Years

Abstract

The Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP) is a statewide initiative offering publicly-funded
vouchers to enroll in local private schools to students in low-performing schools with family
income no greater than 250 percent of the poverty line. Initially established in 2008 as a pilot
program in New Orleans, the LSP was expanded statewide in 2012. This paper examines the
experimental effects of using an LSP scholarship to enroll in a private school on student
achievement in the first two years following the program’s expansion. Our results indicate that
the use of an LSP scholarship has negatively impacted both ELA and math achievement,
although only the latter estimates are statistically significant. Moreover, we observe less negative
effect estimates in the second year of the program.

Keywords: school vouchers, student achievement, randomized control trial, experiment, school
choice

2

The Effects of the Louisiana Scholarship Program on
Student Achievement after Two Years

1. Introduction
The Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP) is a statewide school voucher initiative that provides
public funds for low-income students in underperforming public schools to attend participating
private schools.1 Originally piloted in New Orleans in 2008, the statewide expansion of the LSP
in 2012-13 allowed almost 5,000 low- to moderate-income students across the state of Louisiana
to transfer out of their traditional public schools and into private schools at state expense.2 The
empirical evidence presented here examines how the LSP has impacted student achievement two
years after the statewide expansion.
Our analysis uses the results of the oversubscription lotteries for nearly 10,000 eligible
applicants to analyze the achievement impacts of LSP as a randomized control trial (RCT). In
particular, we use admission lotteries as instrumental variables to estimate the effect of using an
LSP scholarship to enroll in a private school for applicants to oversubscribed lotteries who were
induced to attend a private school as a result of winning the lottery. Our analysis uses studentlevel data obtained via a data-sharing agreement with the state of Louisiana.
In general our results indicate that the use of an LSP scholarship to enroll in private
schools is associated with statistically significant—and substantively large—negative effects on

1

The program was initially called the Student Scholarships for Educational Excellence Program but is now referred
to as the Louisiana Scholarship Program.
2
There are currently three private school choice programs in operation in Louisiana in addition to the Louisiana
Scholarship Program (Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice, 2015). The Louisiana Elementary and
Secondary School Tuition Deduction program was implemented in 2008 to offer tax deductions to individual tax
payers seeking to cover some of their private school expenses. The Louisiana School Choice Program for Certain
Students with Exceptionalities initially launched in 2011 serving students with disabilities. Lastly, the Louisiana
Tuition Donation Rebate Program, a tax-credit scholarship program, was implemented in 2012.
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student math achievement in the first two years of the program’s statewide expansion.
Specifically, LSP users are 34 percent of a standard deviation behind in math after attending their
most preferred private school for two years. The magnitude of these negative estimates is
unprecedented in the literature of random assignment evaluations of school voucher programs. In
contrast, we observe statistically insignificant negative effects associated in ELA after two
years3. Finally, we present evidence indicating that the negative effects are somewhat smaller
magnitude in Year 2 relative to Year 1, especially in math. While not conclusive, these results
suggest the negative impacts of the program may dissipate over time.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief
background on vouchers as a policy instrument in K-12 education. Then we summarize the
existing literature on random assignment evaluations of the participant effects of school voucher
programs. After that, we provide a brief description of the LSP and the lottery process that
enabled the experimental analysis. Next we describe the data and analytical strategy used to
estimate the participant effects of the first year of the statewide expansion of the LSP. We then
describe the results of our analyses. We conclude with a discussion of our findings.
2. School Vouchers and K-12 Education
School vouchers are a mechanism by which government resources are provided to families that
enable them to attend a private school of their choosing (Wolf, 2008). Strictly speaking, a private
school choice program is only a “voucher” program if the government funds the program directly
out of an appropriation. Other private school choice programs are funded indirectly, through tax
credits provided to businesses or individuals who contribute to nonprofit scholarship-granting
organizations. Such arrangements are commonly called tax-credit scholarship programs. Since

3

Sentence edited for typo in original draft.
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tax-credit scholarship programs accomplish the same general purpose as voucher programs we
will treat both types of private school choice programs as functionally equivalent for purposes of
this study, although we will specify whether individual initiatives are voucher or tax-credit
scholarship programs when discussing them.
Although the origin of the voucher idea generally is linked to economist Milton Friedman
(1955), political philosophers Thomas Paine (1791) and John Stuart Mill (1962 [1869])
supported the theoretical debate about their desirability. The theory of school vouchers is that
government should provide funds in support of compulsory education but need not necessarily
deliver the schooling itself.
Whether or not students benefit from non-governmental organizations providing their
education is an empirical question central to the voucher debate (Doolittle & Connors, 2001). For
example, Richard Murnane (2005) argues:
Providing families who lack resources with educational choices makes sense. The
consequences of attempting to do this through a large-scale voucher…system are
unknown. Carefully designed experiments could provide critical knowledge. (p.
181)
Experimental design is critical in the case of evaluating school voucher programs because
of concerns about selection bias due to more motivated and able families self-sorting into private
schools on their own or through access to a voucher. Fortunately, much of the research on school
vouchers in the U.S. has taken the form of random assignment experiments.
Prior Random Assignment Evaluations of School Voucher Programs
Prior rigorous empirical studies of the effects of school vouchers on participants’ achievement
have been inconsistent in their pattern of results and have yet to produce a scholarly consensus
about the impacts of vouchers on students’ academic outcomes (Wolf, 2008; Barrow & Rouse,
2008). The test-score results from experimental and the most rigorous quasi-experimental
5

voucher studies are almost equally divided between findings of modest positive effects and
findings of no significant difference. To date, no rigorous evaluation of vouchers has reported
any statistically significant negative voucher impacts.
A total of 14 analyses have applied experimental, regression discontinuity design (RDD),
or reliable student matching methods to data from voucher and voucher-type scholarship
programs in Charlotte, Dayton, the District of Columbia, Florida, Milwaukee, and New York to
determine their impacts on student achievement. Both analyses of the Charlotte data reported that
the scholarship program produced positive and statistically significant achievement impacts
(Greene, 2001; Cowen, 2008). The experimental evaluation of the Dayton scholarship program
concluded that it produced achievement gains, but only for the African American subgroup of
participants (Howell et al., 2002). A single analysis of experimental data from an early
scholarship program in the District of Columbia concluded that achievement gains from the
program that were evident after two years disappeared in the third and final year of the
evaluation (Howell & Peterson, 2006). The congressionally mandated evaluation of the District
of Columbia Opportunity Scholarship (voucher) Program, established in 2004, reported
achievement impacts, but only in reading, that were statistically significant at a 99 percent level
of confidence after three years (Wolf et al. 2009, p. 36) but only at a 94 percent level of
confidence in the fourth and final year of the study (Wolf et al. 2013; Wolf et al. 2010, p. 35). An
RDD analysis of the tax-credit scholarship program in Florida concluded that students near the
income eligibility cutoff experienced clear achievement gains in reading, but not necessarily in
math, if they had access to the program (Figlio, 2011).
Two different analyses of experimental data from the early years of the Milwaukee
voucher program reached slightly different conclusions, with one reporting that voucher students

6

realized statistically significant achievement gains in both reading and math (Greene, Peterson,
& Du, 1999) and the other stating that the voucher achievement gains were limited to just math
(Rouse, 1998). A more recent evaluation of the Milwaukee program concluded that a
combination of the choice program and a high states testing policy generated test score gains but
only in the fourth and final year of the study and only in reading (Witte et al. 2014).
Five different analyses of data from the New York scholarship experiment also reached
somewhat divergent conclusions. One study reported no significant achievement gains from the
scholarship program, overall or for any subgroup of participants (Krueger & Zhu, 2004). Two
other analyses employing alternative methods for addressing missing data found programinduced gains, but only for African Americans in math (Barnard, Frangakis, Hill, & Rubin, 2003;
Jin, Barnard, & Rubin, 2010). The original experimental analysis concluded that African
American scholarship students outperformed the control group students on a combined measure
of math and reading scores (Mayer et al., 2002).4 Finally, Bitler, Domina, Penner, and Hoynes
(2013) employed quantile analysis in concluding that the program had no clear effects for
individual subgroups along the achievement distribution.
Four additional studies have examined the impact of vouchers on student educational
attainment. Chingos and Peterson (2015) found no overall impact of the New York scholarship
program on the rate of college enrollment but concluded that the African American students and
children of parents born in the U.S. were more likely to enroll in college and earn a bachelor’s
degree if they had used a voucher. Wolf et al. (2013) determined that the effect of using a DC
voucher was to increase high school graduation rates by 21 percentage points. Cowen et al.
(2013) identified positive effects of the Milwaukee program on high school graduation, college

Nevertheless, as Peterson and Howell (2004) note, Krueger and Zhu’s insignificant subgroup findings appear to be
driven in part by the particularly unique way in which they chose to classify students as African American.
4
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enrollment, and college persistence that ranged from 4 to 7 percentage points. Warren (2011)
concluded from cross-sectional data that graduation rates were 18 percentage points higher in
Milwaukee voucher schools compared to Milwaukee Public Schools.
Since the pattern of results from previous experimental and RDD evaluations of voucher
programs has ranged from neutral to positive, with no statistically significant negative impacts of
vouchers on student achievement or attainment having been reported to date, our operating
hypothesis at the start of our evaluation was that the LSP would have a neutral to positive impact
on student outcomes.
Prior Reports on the Test Score Effects of the LSP
Several preliminary reports of the achievement effects of the LSP have been issued from the
Louisiana Department of Education (LDE), our research team, and a second team of scholars.
The LDE has reported annually on the achievement proficiency rates of LSP students aggregated
to the program level and disaggregated to the school level (Louisiana Department of Education
2013; 2014). These reports are descriptive, focus on proficiency cut points, and are used to
evaluate and sanction, if necessary, the private schools participating in the program. Our
evaluation, in contrast, is causal, focuses on student achievement gains relative to similar
students who did not win the scholarship lottery, and is an evaluation of the program as a whole
and not individual private schools. While both types of reports are helpful to policy makers and
the public, they differ in focus and purpose.
Our research team has presented earlier papers on the achievement effects of the LSP to
academic audiences for their reaction and feedback. Our first presentation of one-year results
from our evaluation was at an international conference in January of 2014 (Wolf & Mills, 2014).
We provided additional presentations of our one-year results at national and international policy

8

conferences in March of 2014 (Mills & Wolf, 2014), September of 2014 (Mills, Wolf & Greene
2014a; 2014b), November of 2014 (Mills, Wolf & Greene, 2014c) and January of 2015 (Mills,
Wolf & Greene, 2015). A preliminary version of this report on the two-year effects of the LSP
was presented at the Annual Meetings of the Association for Policy Analysis and Management in
November of 2015 (Mills, Sude & Wolf, 2015). Thus, this particular report represents the
culmination of a long process of research development and refinement to ensure the accuracy
and rigor of the analysis.
A second research team with access to the LSP lottery and student achievement data
released a working paper reporting the one-year impacts of the program in January 2016
(Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak & Walters, 2016). They report negative achievement effects of the LSP
on math, reading, science and social studies that they describe as large. Their analysis only
includes student outcomes in the first year of statewide implementation of the Louisiana voucher
program, as students were tested eight months after switching to a participating private school.
Our evaluation, in contrast, is longitudinal, eventually covering student achievement one, two,
three, and four years after the initial scholarship lottery. Our experimental sample also is slightly
larger than the sample used by the second research team. Finally, to gauge the size of the test
score effects, the second research team compares the effects to annual student gains for the entire
population of students in the Recovery School District of New Orleans, which includes some
students who are not eligible for the LSP and excludes all Louisiana students outside of New
Orleans who are eligible for the program. In this report, we instead determine the magnitude of
the LSP achievement effects by comparing them to the distribution of test score gains of the
randomized control group in our study, which is the ideal counterfactual to the LSP participants.
With these distinctions in mind, readers should note that findings of Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2016)

9

largely correspond with our previously presented papers on the one-year impacts of the LSP, at
least in math and reading. What follows is a description of our more comprehensive evaluation
of the impacts of the LSP both one and two years after random assignment.
3. Description of the Intervention
The Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP) is a statewide school voucher program available to
moderate- to low-income students in low-performing public schools. The scholarship program is
limited to students (1) with family income at or below 250 percent of the federal poverty line
attending a public school that was graded C, D, or F for the prior school year according to the
state’s school accountability system, (2) entering kindergarten, or (3) enrolled in the Recovery
School District. In the program’s first year, 9,809 students were eligible applicants, with a
majority of them located outside of Orleans parish.
The LSP was created by Act 2 of the 2012 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature
and Senate. Act 2 required the state board to allocate the funds for the program annually from the
minimum foundation program. The voucher size is the lesser of the amount allocated to the local
school system in which the student resides or the tuition charged by the participating private
school that the student attends. Average tuition at participating private schools ranges from
$2,966 to $8,999, with a median cost of $4,925, compared to an average total minimum
foundation program per pupil amount of $8,500 for Louisiana public schools.
Private schools must meet certain criteria in order to participate in the program. Those
criteria involve (1) enrollment, (2) financial practice, (3) student mobility, and (4) health, safety
and welfare of students. A recent survey of participating and non-participating private schools in
Louisiana suggests that the program’s regulatory barriers have influenced schools’ choices to
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participate (Kisida, Wolf, & Rhinesmith, 2013), a possibility that we plan to explore in greater
depth in future research.
4. Research Methodology
Experimental Design
When the LSP was expanded to a statewide program in 2012, the Louisiana Department of
Education also changed the lottery process determining scholarship awards. While the original
application process in the New Orleans pilot version of the LSP limited families to submitting
the name of only one private school for admission, the revised application process allowed
individuals to offer up to five private school preferences. This new lottery process is similar to
the deferred acceptance lotteries used in New York City to assign students to schools through the
city’s public school choice program (see Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & Roth, 2005). The deferred
acceptance algorithm is designed to encourage families to reveal their true school preference
rankings and thereby reduce the likelihood of gaming.
While it is not the case that all eligible LSP applicants were awarded scholarships
through a lottery process in the 2012-13 school year, we can isolate cases in which lotteries
occurred in order to perform an experimental evaluation of the program.
Specifically, eligible LSP applicants are allowed to submit up to five private school
preferences and the LSP lottery algorithm attempts to place students into schools while taking
into account several lottery priorities. First, students with disabilities and “multiple birth
siblings”5 are manually awarded LSP scholarships if there is available space at their given school
preference. Remaining students are grouped into one of six priority categories:

5

“Multiple birth siblings” are twins, triplets, etc.
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Priority 1 - Students who received LSP scholarships in the prior school year who are
applying to the same school



Priority 2 - Siblings of Priority 1 awardees in the current round



Priority 3 - Students who received LSP scholarships in the prior school year who are
applying to a different school



Priority 4 – New applicants who attended public schools that received a “D” or “F”
grade in Louisiana’s school accountability system at baseline



Priority 5 – New applicants who attended public schools that received a “C” grade in
Louisiana’s school accountability system at baseline



Priority 6 – New applicants who are applying for kindergarten placements
The first stage of the LSP award process is summarized in Figure 1. The process begins

by attempting to place all Priority 1 category students into their first choice school.6 The
algorithm first groups Priority 1 students applying to the same school and grade combination and
then checks the number of available seats for that grouping. If there are more seats than
applicants, all students receive an LSP scholarship. If there are no seats available, no students in
the given group receive a scholarship. Finally, if there are more applicants than seats, students
are awarded LSP scholarships through a lottery. Once the process is complete for all Priority 1
students, the algorithm attempts to place Priority 2 students into their first choice school. After
cycling through all remaining priority categories, the LSP algorithm moves to the second stage
of the allocation process by attempting to place students who have yet to receive a scholarship in

6

By definition, the first choice school for a priority 1 category student is the school they previously attended in the
New Orleans pilot version of the program.
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their second choice schools. The LSP algorithm continues until all eligible applicants have either
been awarded or not awarded an LSP scholarship.

Figure 1. First stage of the Louisiana Scholarship Program award allocation process for the
2012-13 school year. This figure illustrates the iterative process used to allocate LSP
scholarships to students. In addition, this figure highlights the fact that only a subset of students
was awarded LSP scholarships via lotteries. Our analysis focuses on isolating lotteries for one’s
first choice school.
Only a subset of eligible applicants were awarded or not awarded an LSP scholarship via
a lottery process. Specifically, only those students in priority categories one through six whose
school-grade combination had more applicants than available seats participated in a lottery.
Fortunately, using data on student characteristics and school preferences, we can identify the
subset of eligible applicants who experienced a lottery process.7 We will focus on this subset of
lottery participants to estimate the effects of the LSP on student achievement after two years of

7

We identify a lottery as occurring when the percentage of students awarded an LSP scholarship falls between 0 and
100 percent for a given school preference by grade by priority category combination. For example, if 60 percent of
Priority 1 category students applying to third grade at school “A” as their first choice school actually received
scholarships, we identify all students in that combination as having been subject to a lottery.
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program participation because these are the only applicants for whom LSP scholarship award
was randomly determined. 8 This focus on oversubscription lotteries suggests our analysis may
be capturing the most favorable estimates of the program’s effectiveness, as higher quality
schools are often more likely to be oversubscribed than lower quality schools (Abdulkadiroglu,
Angrist, Dynarski, Kane, & Pathak, 2011).
Data Description
Most of the data for this study come from student-level datasets provided by the Louisiana
Department of Education (LDE) in compliance with our data agreement with the state. The LDE
provided us with their:


Student Information Systems (SIS) files for 2011-12 (“Baseline”) and 2012-13 (“Year 1
Outcome”) which includes data on student enrollment and demographic background;



LSP eligible applicant file, which includes information on the school choice sets of all
eligible applicants as well as the results of the 2011-12 placement lottery;



State assessment files for the 2011-12, 2012-13, and 2013-14 school years, which include
data on each student’s participation in the annual accountability assessments and their
scores.9
The Louisiana state accountability system places a strong emphasis on test-based

accountability, with standardized assessments offered in most grades—including alternative

8

After accounting for student testing, demographic, and school data while also limiting our analysis to students in
binding lotteries, approximately 8 percent of the analytical sample were in Priority Category 1, 1 percent were in
Priority Category 3, 73 percent were in Priority Category 4, and 18 percent were in Priority Category 5. Priority
Category 2 is not represented in our analysis.
9
Sentence edited for typo in original draft.

14

assessments, end-of-course exams, and exams measuring college-readiness.10 This study uses
student performance on the Louisiana state assessments in grades three through eight as our
primary outcome measure of interest.11 All students participating in the LSP are required to be
tested by their private schools, using the state accountability assessments, for any grade in which
the public school system also tests its students.
In addition to individual performance outcomes, the state-provided assessment data files
include information on student demographics as well as participation in school initiatives such as
the free- and reduced-price lunch (FRL) program and special education program enrollments.
Our analysis includes these baseline covariates in order to improve effect estimate precision.12

10

Students in Louisiana who are not classified as having a special need that qualifies them for alternative programs
take one of two state assessments in grades three through eight. In grades four and eight, students take the Louisiana
Educational Assessment Program (LEAP) exams, a series of criterion-referenced tests aligned with Louisiana’s state
standards for the subjects of math, English language arts, science, and social studies. In the remaining grades,
students take the Integrated Louisiana Educational Assessment Program (iLEAP) exams, a series of hybrid exams
including both criterion-referenced and norm-referenced test items in the same subjects as the LEAP exams.
Performance on both sets of exams ranges between a minimum possible score of 100 and a maximum possible score
of 500. All exams are scaled with means of 300 and standard deviations of 50 (Louisiana Department of Education,
2013a; 2013b). Rather than rely on these scale score values, which differ across grades by design, our analysis is
primarily based on standardized values of individual LEAP and iLEAP performance. While the LEAP and iLEAP
item differences introduce noise into our model, the fact that both treatment and control students in a particular
grade take the same exam (either LEAP or iLEAP), and our inclusion of prior achievement on the right-hand side of
the model, should reduce the likelihood of bias due to these test differences.
11
Our initial investigation of the test databases revealed 391 eligible LSP applicants in tested grades with missing
testing data at baseline and 516 observations in Year 1. These observations represent approximately 10 and 15
percent of the eligible LSP applicants in relevant grade ranges for these years, respectively. Further investigation
revealed that 82 of the missing observations took the Louisiana alternative assessments at baseline and 115 took
them in Year 1. All records with missing baseline testing data are excluded from our analysis. In addition, a small
number of eligible LSP applicants have duplicate records in the baseline (12 duplicate pairs) and Year 1 testing data
(42 duplicate pairs). When possible, we have resolved duplicates by keeping records with the most complete data on
LSP participants. For the remaining observations, we have randomly kept one record and dropped the other. These
records represent less than 1 percent of the LSP applicants in both years.
12
A single individual in our final analysis sample has missing data for their gender status as baseline (2011-12). We
have updated this individual’s gender status using their reported gender in the 2012-13 assessment data. After
making this substitution, all records in our final analysis sample have complete information on baseline covariates.
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Sample Selection Process
The student-level data provided by the LDE indicate an initial sample of 9,809 eligible LSP
applicants in the first year of the statewide expansion of the program. Of these, 5,777 students
received LSP scholarship placements in a specific private school and 4,038 did not receive a
voucher-supported placement. Our analysis relies on a non-random sample of this original
population comprised of eligible applicants with baseline testing data in grades three through six
who did not list a special education designation on their application and who were not multiple
birth siblings. Of the 2,541 observations meeting these criteria, we identify 1,688 individuals as
participating in LSP scholarship lotteries. Of these, 668—or 40 percent—won LSP scholarships.
Analytical Strategy
We begin with a description of our primary analyses, which use the results of eligible applicants’
first school choice lotteries to estimate the impact of LSP scholarship usage on student
achievement in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) framework. We then outline a series of
subgroup analyses conducted to examine possible effect heterogeneity of the LSP.
Local Average Treatment Effect estimation. As Bloom and Unterman (2014) note,
because students can participate in multiple lotteries in a deferred-acceptance award process, the
traditional intent-to-treat (ITT) estimator has limited policy relevance.13 Instead, we estimate the
impact of LSP scholarship usage on student achievement—also known as the Local Average
Treatment Effect (LATE) (Angrist & Pischke, 2009, Cowen, 2008)—by using the result of one’s
first choice school lottery as an instrumental variable to predict scholarship usage in a 2SLS
framework.14 The lottery is an ideal instrumental variable as the high placement take-up rate for

13

For example, a student who loses her first lottery can still win an LSP scholarship to her second choice school via
lottery.
14
Prior experimental evaluations of voucher programs have varied in their focus on ITT and LATE.
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this program ensures that it is a strong predictor of private schooling while the random nature of
the lottery process assures that scholarship receipt is uncorrelated with unobserved factors related
to student achievement (Murray 2006). Because the lottery is the only way a student could
receive an LSP scholarship to attend a private school, we can be confident that the variable only
influences student outcomes through the private schooling that it enables.
Specifically, we use the following 2SLS model to estimate the effects of LSP scholarship
usage on student achievement after two years:
1.

𝐸𝑖 = ∑𝜋𝑗 𝑅𝑗𝑖 + 𝛿𝑇𝑖 + 𝑿𝜷 + 𝑢𝑖

2.

𝐴𝑖 = ∑𝛼𝑗 𝑅𝑗𝑖 + 𝜏𝐸̂𝑖 + 𝑿𝜸 + 𝜖𝑖

Where i denotes student and j denotes lottery:


E is a variable indicating if a student used an LSP scholarship to enroll in a private
school15



𝑅𝑖 is a fixed effect for a student’s first choice school lottery16



𝑇𝑖 is a variable indicating if a student received an LSP scholarship to their first choice
school



𝐴𝑖 is student standardized math or English Language Arts achievement in Year 2 of the
program (2013-14)17



𝑋𝑖 is a vector of student characteristics—including achievement—collected at baseline
(2011-12)
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Prior evaluations of school voucher programs have examined enrollment effects in several ways. For example,
Mayer et al. (2002) define enrollment as being “consistently enrolled in a private school”, while Rouse (1998)
defines enrollment as the number of years enrolled in an attempt to capture potential dosage effects. By defining
enrollment as “ever attending a private school” our study falls in line with the Wolf et al. (2013) evaluation of the
DC Opportunity Scholarship Program.
16
We include a fixed effect for first school choice lottery to account for differing probabilities of success across
lotteries (Gerber & Green, 2012). By using fixed effects, we are essentially comparing lottery winners and losers
within the same strata to calculate unbiased estimates of the effect of being randomly offered an LSP scholarship.
The approach is comparable to analyzing the impact of hundreds of “mini-experiments” and aggregating the results
across them.
17
Student achievement scores are standardized using distributional parameters of outcomes from the control group.
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The 2SLS procedure first uses one’s treatment status to predict the number of years they
will use a scholarship and then uses this predicted value to provide an unbiased LATE effect
estimate (𝜏̂ ) for the program. The proposed method instruments for LSP usage with the result of
one’s first choice school lottery outcome (T). The 2SLS procedure will effectively treat students
who lose their first choice lottery but go on to win an LSP to a lower school preference as
control-group crossovers, thereby effectively excluding them from the estimated LATE (Bloom
& Unterman, 2014).
There are at least two types of nesting in the LSP data that could lead to biased inference
(Angrist & Pischke, 2009). First, members of both the treatment and control group are nested
within schools in the first year of the program analysis. Second, observations can be nested
within family units, with the potential for several children participating from the same family.18
This was also the case in the evaluation of the Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP) in
Washington, DC, in which researchers used standard errors clustered at the family level to
account for error-covariance (Wolf et al., 2013). The results presented here do not account for
these types of nesting due to the complex nature of multi-level clustering. Instead, we currently
only account for nesting of observations within risk set.19 We do not believe our results are
strongly influenced by sibling clustering, as siblings constitute only 19 percent of our analytical
sample.
Subgroup analysis. In addition to estimating overall program impacts, we examine the
extent to which LSP effects differ across different subgroups. In particular, we determine if there
are differential impacts experienced for four subgroups: (1) males relative to females, (2) African

18

Approximately 23 percent of individuals in our final analytical sample have siblings that also appear in the
sample.
19
Clustering on risk set should capture a large amount of the nesting of individuals within current school as risk set
includes school of application.
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American participants compared to all other program participants, (3) students in different
baseline achievement categories, and (4) New Orleans participants compared to other
participants. The first three comparisons are motivated by prior evaluations of school choice
programs, which have found differential effects by gender, ethnicity, and baseline achievement
groups.20 The final subgroup comparison is motivated by the strong existing market for school
choice in New Orleans in comparison with the rest of the state. In addition to having a pilot
version of the LSP in place since 2008, New Orleans has a thriving charter school market and a
history of public school choice (Cowen Institute, 2013). Moreover, there is evidence that the
New Orleans reforms have increased student achievement by between 20 and 40 percent of a
standard deviation (Harris, 2015). As such, the experiences of LSP participants in New Orleans
may differ from other participants.
5. Treatment-Control Contrast
Here we examine the extent to which treatment assignment is correlated with school enrollment
by looking at school enrollments for lottery winners and losers. We then assess the extent to
which the lottery process resulted in covariate balance at baseline for our analysis sample.
Scholarship Usage
While eligible applicants were randomly assigned to receive or not receive an LSP scholarship
with private school placement, participating families were not required to use the scholarship to
attend their designated school. Lottery winners, for example, could choose to attend traditional
public schools or charter schools rather than use their scholarship offer to attend the private
20

Analyses of the New York Scholarship Program have found significant effects for African Americans, but
insignificant effect estimates overall (Mayer et al., 2002; Barnard et al., 2003). Similarly, Wolf and colleagues
(2013) report significant improvement in reading for female participants in the DC OSP evaluation, but no
significant differences for males. Finally, Wolf and colleagues additionally note positive achievement effects for
students who were already performing well at baseline.
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school in which they were placed by the lottery. Lottery losers, on the other hand, could choose
to attend a traditional public school, attend charter schools, or elect to enroll in private schools
without a scholarship.
Table 1 describes the patterns of enrollment for student applicants for the 2012-13 school
year who received and did not receive LSP scholarships to their first choice schools in the first
and second years of the program. Because our LATE analysis focuses on the results of first
choice school lotteries, the control group includes both students who were never awarded a
scholarship and students who received a scholarship to one of their non-first choice school
preferences. The latter group, who account for the 61 control group members appearing in
private schools in 2012-13 and 133 in 2013-14, are the control-group crossovers in our LATE
analysis.21
The majority of lottery winners used their scholarships to attend private schools, while
over 75 percent of students who did not receive scholarships attended public sector schools in
both years. Sample attrition represents less than 10 percent of the analytical sample in both years;
however it is only in Year 1 that the difference in attrition rates between treatment and control (at
5 percentage points) is sufficiently large to merit concern (What Works Clearinghouse, 2014).
These missing outcome observations could represent control-group crossovers attending private
schools or students that moved out of Louisiana in the 2012-13 school year. Unfortunately, our
reliance on the state testing data does not allow us to distinguish the causes behind these missing
data. While our primary estimates of the effects of LSP scholarship usage on student
achievement after two years do not account for differential attrition, we examine the sensitivity

21

The increase in control group students attending private schools between 2012-13 and 2013-14 is explained by
students re-applying for the program in Year 2. Our LATE analysis additionally treats these students as “noncompliers”.
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of our results to differential attrition using an effect bounding exercise developed by Lee
(2009).22 In general, the results from our bounding analyses do not suggest that differential
attrition has strongly influenced our primary LATE estimates.
Table 1.
School enrollment patterns by scholarship award
Treatment Group
(Received Scholarship to
School of Attendance
First Choice School)
N
%
Year 1 (2012-13)
Private School
508
77%
Public School
123
19%
Unknown/Missing School
28
4%
Year 2 (2013-14)
Private School
387
59%
Public School
215
33%
Unknown/Missing School
57
9%
Total
659

Control Group
(Did Not Receive Scholarship
to First Choice School)
N
%
54
857
93

6%
85%
9%

126
784
94
1,004

13%
78%
10%

Notes. Sample represents all students with baseline testing data in grades three through six who did not list a special
education exclusion on the LSP application and who were not identified as multiple birth siblings. For students in
the treatment group attending public schools, 73 percent attended a traditional public school (TPS), 24 percent
attended a charter school, and 2 percent attended a magnet school in Year 1. In Year 2, the corresponding
percentages are 69 percent TPS, 27 percent charter, and 5 percent magnet. For control group students attending
public schools in Year 1, 76 percent attended TPS, 16 percent public charters, and 8 percent attended public magnet
schools. In Year 2, the respective percentages are 71 percent TPS, 20 percent charter, and 9 percent magnet.
Source. Authors’ calculations.

Baseline Equivalence
The final step required before moving on to our empirical analysis of the participant effects of
the statewide expansion of the LSP is to analyze the extent to which the LSP lottery process

22

We have two broad methods available to account for non-response bias: employing non-response weights or
making assumptions about the nature of non-response to estimate bounds around the program’s true effect (Gerber
& Green, 2012). Nonresponse weights effectively reweight the data to allow respondent values to account for the
values of non-respondents (Kreuter & Valliant, 2007). Nevertheless, nonresponse weights do not account for
potential unobservable forces that may be driving patterns of nonresponse. If, for example, those in the control
group with higher expected outcomes both in public and private school leave the sample with higher probability, our
LATE estimates will be positively biased. Given the likelihood that the observed control non-response reflects
potential selection effects, we prefer instead to estimate the degree to which attrition might affect our estimates via a
bounding exercise (Lee, 2009). Specifically, if we assume that the causes of missing data are monotonic, we can
estimate an upper and lower bound for the LSP effect by omitting a portion of the control group from the data in
order to balance non-response probabilities among treated and controls.
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actually ensured independence of assignment to the treatment and control groups. While we
cannot know the extent to which members of the treatment and control group differ on
unobservable characteristics, we can get a good idea of the success of the lottery process by
examining if there is baseline equivalence in observable characteristics between lottery winners
and losers. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2, which provides the results of ttests for differences in means on key baseline covariates between members of the treatment and
control groups included in our analysis sample, with p < .10 as the lowest threshold of statistical
significance.23
Table 2.
Baseline equivalence of treatment and control groups on covariates

Female
Race/Ethnicity
African American
Hispanic
White
Other
Limited English Proficiency
Free-or-Reduced Price Lunch
Number of School Preferences Listed
Standardized Performance†
ELA Scale Score
Math Scale Score
Science Scale Score
Social Studies Scale Score

N

Lottery
Winners

Lottery
Losers

Diff.

s.e.

1,663

0.51

0.51

0.01

0.03

1,663
1,663
1,663
1,663
1,663
1,663
1,663

0.90
0.02
0.06
0.02
0.02
0.86
2.15

0.91
0.01
0.07
0.01
0.01
0.86
2.35

0.00
0.01
-0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.20***

0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.06

1,662
1,663
1,660
1,660

-0.35
-0.39
-0.47
-0.41

-0.35
-0.45
-0.50
-0.42

0.01
0.06
0.03
0.02

0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05

*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10
† Scores are standardized within grade based on the observed distributions of scale scores across Louisiana.
Notes. The analysis sample excludes students with disabilities, multiple birth siblings, and individuals without
baseline testing data in grades three through six All analyses include fixed effects for one’s first school choice
lottery. “s.e.” indicates standard error of the difference, which accounts for clustering within risk sets.
Source. Authors’ calculations

23

All analyses include fixed effects for one’s first school choice lottery to account for different probabilities of
selection.
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The results are favorable for our analysis, as nearly all of the estimated differences
between lottery winners and losers are statistically insignificant, suggesting that we have
adequately identified random lotteries in our analytical sample. The lone exception is that lottery
winners provided significantly fewer school preferences on average than lottery losers. Given
this differences, our preferred models include controls for the full set of variables examined in
Table 2.24
6. Results
This section presents the results of our primary analyses of the impacts of the statewide
expansion of the LSP on student achievement after two years.
Primary Estimates of the Impact of Using an LSP on Student Achievement
The results of our primary LATE analyses are presented in Table 3. Column 1 displays
coefficient estimates for first stage regressions using scholarship award to predict the likelihood
of usage.25 The results indicate that students who received an LSP scholarship to their most
preferred school were nearly 50 percentage points more likely to attend a private school two
years later. Columns 2 through 5 present our primary LATE estimates, with models controlling
for an increasing number of baseline covariates as one moves from left to right in the table.
Given the observed differences on some baseline covariates in Table 2, our preferred estimates
of the effect of using an LSP scholarship come from the fully specified model presented in
column 5.

24

We present in Appendix Table A1 a supplemental analysis that does not require the inclusion of baseline
achievement. The presented results do not differ substantively from our primary effect estimates (presented in Table
3).
25
Estimates are presented for fully specified models. In general, results from all first-stage regressions indicate that
winning an LSP lottery to attend one’s most preferred school strongly predicts actual enrollment.
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In general, LSP scholarship users appear to score worse than their control group
counterparts on the state’s ELA and math exams; however the negative estimates for ELA
achievement are not statistically significant. In contrast, LSP scholarship users score 34 percent
of a standard deviation behind their control group counterparts in math after two years of
enrollment in their most-preferred private school.26 These large and statistically significant
negative findings for math are unprecedented among experimental evaluations school vouchers
programs in the U.S.
Table 3.
Estimated effects of LSP usage on student achievement after two years
First Stage
Local Average Treatment Effect
Outcome
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
0.48***
-0.18
-0.18
-0.17
-0.18
English Language Arts
(0.02)
(0.12)
(0.12)
(0.11)
(0.12)
0.48***
-0.32***
-0.33**
-0.33**
-0.34**
Mathematics
(0.02)
(0.11)
(0.16)
(0.14)
(0.14)
Controls
Baseline Achievement
X
X
X
X
X
Demographics
X
X
X
X
Number of Choices
X
X
X
New Orleans
X
X
N
1,525
Risk Sets
177
*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10
Notes. Performance measures standardized within grade based on control group score distributions. All models
include risk set fixed effects. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering within risk sets. First stage Fstatistics all exceed Staiger and Stock’s (1997) recommended threshold of 10.
Source. Authors’ calculations.

While the focus of this paper is on how the LSP has affected achievement over two years,
we are also interested in the extent to which the program’s effects vary over time. Figure 2
presents LATE estimates for ELA and math achievement separately conducted for years 1 and 2.

26

The results presented in Table 3 do not appear to be driven by a dramatic achievement gains in the control group
relative to the treatment group (see figures A1 and A2 in the Appendix).
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The vertical axis represents within-grade and subject standardized achievement in 2013-14 and
the dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. All models are fully specified.

Standardized Achievement

0.20

0.00

-0.18

-0.20*
-0.20

-0.34*
-0.40
-0.60
-0.64*
-0.80
-1.00
YEAR 1

YEAR 2

English Language Arts

Mathematics

Figure 2. Estimated Local Average Treatment Effects over time. Figure presents point estimates from fully specified
models in Year 1 and Year 2 for both math and ELA. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals for the
performance averages. These results indicate large negative achievement effects associated with LSP scholarship
usage after one year of program participation. By 2013-14, treatment group students appear to have been making
small gains on the control group, with the effect on ELA achievement statistically indistinguishable from zero and
the effect on math nearly half that observed after one year of participation.

The findings in Figure 2 indicate that, in both years, LSP scholarship usage is associated
with negative and statistically significant impacts on math achievement; with seemingly larger
negative effects in Year 1. In contrast, the results for ELA indicate a statistically significant
initial negative impact on achievement in Year 1 that dissipates to insignificance by Year 2.27
Thus, for both ELA and math, we find evidence suggesting the magnitude of the negative
impacts are shrinking over time.

27

The ELA effect is estimated with less precision in Year 2 relative to Year 1, as reflected in the larger confidence
interval.
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To summarize, our primary models indicate that students using LSP scholarships to
attend their most-preferred private school have experienced negative achievement impacts,
especially in math. While there is some evidence suggesting the magnitude of these negative
effects may be dissipating over time, it is important to recognize that we find negative and
statistically significant effects across all models. Relative to the existing experimental
evaluations of voucher programs in the U.S., these negative and statistically significant findings
are unique. At the same time, it is important to note that our evaluation is also unique among
voucher experiments in its use of state criterion-referenced tests (CRTs) as outcome measures
instead of norm-referenced tests (NRTs).28 Furthermore, these results are based on a subset of
students (approximately twenty percent of all eligible LSP applicants) who are often enrolling in
new private schools in non-typical entry grades for schools. Thus, it is possible these effects may
not be representative of the experiences of all LSP participants.29 Nevertheless, the results
presented in Table 3 indicate sizeable negative two-year achievement impacts in math associated
with using an LSP scholarship.30
Subgroup Analysis
In addition to estimating the general impacts of participation in the LSP on student achievement,
we are interested in how various student subgroups respond to the treatment. Table 4 presents
LATE estimates for two subgroup comparisons: females versus males and black students

28

All of the studies discussed in section 4 used NRT exams as their primary outcome measures. In contrast, the
legislation creating the Louisiana Scholarship Program has determined the state’s LEAP and iLEAP CRT exams to
be the primary outcome measure of interest in the program’s evaluation.
29
We are able to expand our sample slightly by relaxing the baseline achievement requirement in our models. While
we observe changes in magnitude, the negative findings present in Table 3 do not change substantially when
relaxing this requirement (see Appendix Table A1).
30
While our analysis focuses on differences in ELA and math achievement, we have confirmed that these large
negative effects are equally present in both science and social studies achievement. In particular, the results
presented in Appendix Table A2 indicate that negative results for science and social studies, however only the latter
finding is statistically significant.
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compared to students of other race/ethnicities.31 Columns 1 through 3 present differences across
gender and columns 4 through 6 present models comparing black students to other students. The
table is further divided into two panels, with Panel A presenting results for models controlling
only for baseline achievement and risk set fixed effects and Panel B presenting results from
fully-specified models. Joint F-statistics from first stage regressions predicting LSP usage and an
interaction of LSP usage and a subgroup identifier are presented along with the overall results.
Each of the reported F-statistics suggests that LSP scholarship receipt is a relevant predictor of
usage.
Looking first at the gender subgroup analysis, we see that, in general, the estimated math
effects for females (column 1) and males (column 2) are not substantially different from the
overall effect estimates presented in Table 3. This is furthermore supported by the lack of
significant findings in column 3, the estimated differences in treatment effects between females
and males. In ELA, the estimated effect is significant for females, but not for males.
Nevertheless, the difference between the two groups is not statistically significant.
The race/ethnicity subgroup analysis results presented in columns 4 through 6 indicate
that black students and other race students did not experience significantly different effects of
LSP scholarship usage. The effect estimates for other race students are somewhat noisy,
however. While this is not surprising, as these students comprise a relatively small proportion of
LSP applicants, they may have experienced substantially larger negative impacts on math
achievement relative to black students. Nevertheless, as indicated by the insignificant difference
estimates presented in column 6, we cannot say with any reasonable level of statistical certainty
that the true effects differ between the two groups.

31

The results are based on the models that include terms interacting predicted LSP usage with the particular
subgroup of interest.
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Table 4
Estimated effects of LSP usage after two years, gender and race/ethnicity subgroups
Black
Other
Females
Males
Diff.
Students Students
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Panel A: Simple Model
-0.21*
-0.14
-0.07
-0.18
-0.13
English Language Arts
(0.12)
(0.19)
(0.20)
(0.12)
(0.25)
-0.30** -0.34**
0.04
-0.29**
-0.58
Mathematics
(0.13)
(0.17)
(0.16)
(0.13)
(0.39)
Panel B: Fully Specified Model
-0.22*
-0.14
-0.08
-0.19
-0.14
English Language Arts
(0.12)
(0.17)
(0.20)
(0.13)
(0.24)
-0.33** -0.35**
0.02
-0.30** -0.62**
Mathematics
(0.16)
(0.15)
(0.16)
(0.15)
(0.29)
†
Model Summary
N
1,525
1,525
Risk Sets
177
177
First Stage F Statistics
LSP Use
41.36
54.47
Interaction
74.27
57.55

Diff.
(6)
-0.05
(0.27)
0.29
(0.35)
-0.05
(0.26)
0.32
(0.27)

*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10
† Model summary is from fully specified math regressions.
Notes. Panel A (Simple Model) presents results of estimations that only control for baseline achievement and risk set
fixed effects. Panel B (Fully Specified Model) additionally controls for student demographics, number of school
preferences offered, and geography. Performance measures standardized within grade based on control group score
distributions. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering within risk sets.
Source. Authors’ calculations.

Finally, we examine the extent to which the estimated effects vary by baseline
achievement and geographic location, as captured by one residing in or outside New Orleans
when applying to the program. Table 5 presents results of regressions run separately for three
performance subgroups (columns 1 through 3), as well as program applicants originally residing
within and outside New Orleans (columns 4 and 5).32

32

For the baseline achievement comparison, we must run separate regressions because we are unable to include both
a control for baseline achievement and variables indicating baseline performance categories in the same model. For
the New Orleans comparison, we must run separate regressions due to the inclusion of lottery fixed effects. Lotteries
are defined by the school a student is applying to, which will either be located within or outside New Orleans. In
order to identify an interaction of treatment status and New Orleans residency, a model employing lottery fixed
effects requires variation on city of residence within treatment status within a given lottery. This is highly unlikely
and, even when such variation exists, it is unlikely to be representative of the experience of New Orleanians and
non-New Orleanians. We avoid this issue by estimating separate regressions.
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Table 5
Estimated effects of LSP usage after two years, achievement and geography subgroups
Achievement Subgroups
Geography Subgroups
Lower
Third

Middle
Third

Upper
Third

(1)
(2)
(3)
Panel A: Simple Model
0.25
-0.16
-0.42***
English Language Arts
(0.33)
(0.16)
(0.16)
0.24
-0.38
-0.44**
Mathematics
(0.36)
(0.28)
(0.18)
Panel B: Fully Specified Model
0.05
-0.12
-0.41***
English Language Arts
(0.31)
(0.17)
(0.14)
0.32
-0.40*
-0.49**
Mathematics
(0.40)
(0.21)
(0.19)
Model summary†
N
509-512 508-513 503-505
Risk Sets
146
145
142
First Stage
0.57
0.48
0.40
LSP Use
(0.05)
(0.06)
(0.05)
Joint F-statistic
224.49
92.15
150.89

New Orleans
Student

Other
Location

(4)

(5)

-0.20
(0.64)
-0.82
(0.96)

-0.16
(0.10)
-0.27**
(0.11)

-0.32
(0.62)
-0.85
(0.73)

-0.15
(0.10)
-0.26**
(0.11)

254
67

1,271
142

0.34
(0.08)
29.26

0.52
(0.02)
755.00

*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10
† Model summary is from fully specified math regressions.
Notes. Panel A (Simple Model) presents results of estimations that only control for baseline achievement and risk set
fixed effects. Panel B (Fully Specified Model) additionally controls for student demographics, number of school
preferences offered, and geography. Performance measures standardized within grade based on control group score
distributions. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering within risk sets.
Source. Authors’ calculations.

While nearly all point estimates suggest a negative effect, the estimates themselves are
often quite noisy. Among performance categories, it appears that only students performing in the
upper third of the achievement distribution at baseline have statistically significant negative
impacts. Students initially performing in the upper third of the achievement distribution ended up
40 percent of a standard deviation behind their control group counterparts in ELA and math after
two years. In contrast, students initially scoring in the lower end of the performance distribution
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do not appear to have experienced significant negative achievement impacts associated with LSP
scholarship usage.
In addition, the LATE estimates are noticeably more negative for students in New
Orleans (column 4); however these estimates are particularly noisy given the small number of
students contributing to the analysis. The estimates for non-New Orleans students are slightly
smaller than the main effects presented in Table 3, further providing some evidence that the
relatively more negative, yet noisy, effects observed in the New Orleans subsample of students is
pulling down the overall effect.
Robustness Checks
In general, our analyses indicate that participation in the statewide expansion of the LSP
negatively impacted student achievement on Louisiana’s state assessments after two years. These
negative findings are unique among random assignment evaluations of school voucher programs,
all of which have found insignificant or positive outcomes. In this section, we present two
sensitivity analyses designed to test the robustness of our findings.
Sensitivity of results to differential attrition. Our first robustness check examines the
extent to which our estimated effects are sensitive to the different rates of attrition observed
between treatment and control group members in our sample in the 2012-13 school year.
Specifically, we find that 93—or 9 percent—of students who did not win an LSP to their first
choice school do not appear in the state’s assessment data in 2012-13; whereas only 4 percent of
LSP winners are missing. While this difference is not cause for great concern (What Works
Clearinghouse, 2014), it is important to consider if differential attrition is driving our primary
findings. This subsection focuses exclusively on differential attrition in 2012-13, as the sample
attrition rates are roughly equal in the 2013-14 school year.
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If we can assume the observed differences in attrition are due to random factors, our
LATE estimates are generally less precise but are not biased by differential attrition (Gerber &
Green, 2012). On the other hand, if the observed differences are due to systemic, yet
unobservable, sample selection effects, our primary estimates of the effect of using an LSP
scholarship on student achievement are biased (Gerber & Green, 2012; Lee, 2009). If, for
example, those in the control group with higher expected outcomes both in public and private
school leave the sample with higher probability, our LATE estimates will be positively biased.
Here, we examine the extent to which differential attrition may be biasing our results by
using a bounding strategy. In particular, we use a technique developed by Lee (2009)—hereafter
referred to as “Lee Bounds”—that involves removing a subset of applicants from the treatment
group in an attempt to parse out marginal individuals who have selected into the sample only
because they received an LSP scholarship.33 In particular, Lee shows that if one can assume that
problematic attrition is only present in either the treatment or control group, then one can
effectively bound the average treatment effect for individuals whose treatment status does not
influence their sample selection likelihood by trimming away from that group a percentage of
applicants equal to the attrition difference from the bottom and top performers. These trimming
procedures produce upper and lower bounds of the effect, respectively.34

Lee’s (2009) bounding method is built on two assumptions: that the assignment mechanism is random and that
sample selection is a monotonic function of treatment status. The first assumption is easily satisfied by the LSP
lottery process. The second assumption essentially requires that there are no LSP applicants who were assigned an
LSP scholarship but decided to forgo their scholarship and instead enroll in a private school at their own expense.
While we cannot validate this assumption empirically, it seems highly unlikely that such “defiers” exist in our
data—especially given the program’s income threshold.
34
One of the primary benefits of Lee’s bounding method is that it does not require strong assumptions on the
selection mechanism producing the attrition problems beyond the assumption that the effect is only present in either
the treatment or control groups. For example, one need not assume that control group attriters are either more- or
less-academically able than students who actively choose to remain in the sample. Nevertheless, the simplicity of
Lee’s method comes at a cost: Lee bounds can be quite large—especially in the presence of large differences in
nonresponse rates
33
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Table 6 presents both the original LATE estimates produced in Table 3–included as a
reference—as well as results from the two bounding exercises described. Columns 2 through 4
present models controlling only for baseline achievement and risk set while columns 5 through 7
present models that additionally include controls for demographics and residence.
As expected, the Lee bounds presented in Table 6 are quite large, with differences
between lower and upper bounds of over 20 percent of a standard deviation in achievement.
Despite the magnitude of these gaps, the results for math are consistent with LSP scholarship
usage having a negative effect on achievement. In contrast, the results for ELA suggest that—in
a best case scenario—LSP scholarship usage may have had an insignificant effect on student
achievement after one year. Given the magnitude of the estimated effect, along with the
knowledge that these estimates are based on removing the lowest performers from the treatment
group, we are hesitant to conclude that the overall effect of the LSP on ELA achievement was
null in the first year of the statewide expansion. Nevertheless, if this assumption is met, the
results presented in Table 6 suggest the possibility that the two groups did not differ in ELA
achievement after one year.
In general, the results presented in this section do not suggest that differential attrition has
strongly biased the primary results presented in Table 3. Specifically, unless we make fairly
restrictive assumptions, LSP scholarship usage continues to be associated with negative impacts
in both math and ELA achievement. While our upper bound estimate of the LSP effect on ELA
achievement using Lee’s bounds is indeed statistically insignificant, we caution the reader
against using this extreme estimate to serve as the program’s effect on student achievement after
one year.
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Table 6.
Accounting for differential attrition in Year 1

N
(1)
Primary LATE
Lee Bounds

Primary LATE
Lee Bounds

1,537
1,503 – 1,509

1,538
1,504 – 1,510

Simple Model
Lower
Upper
Primary LATE
Bound
Bound
(2)
(3)
(4)
Panel A: ELA Achievement
-0.18***
(0.06)
-0.27***
-0.07
(0.06)
(0.06)
Panel B: Math Achievement
-0.63***
(0.07)
-0.70*** -0.49***
(0.07)
(0.08)

Fully Specified Model
Lower
Primary LATE
Bound
(5)
(6)

Upper
Bound
(7)

-0.20***
(0.08)
-0.28***
(0.07)

-0.09*
(0.05)

-0.64***
(0.09)
-0.71*** -0.50***
(0.08)
(0.08)

*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10
Notes. “Simple Model” refers to estimations that only control for baseline achievement and risk set fixed effects. “Fully Specified Model” refers to estimations
that additionally control for student demographics, number of school preferences offered, and geography. Performance measures standardized within grade based
on control group score distributions. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering within risk sets.
Source. Authors’ calculation

32

Curricular advantage. It is important to recognize that our analyses are based on
achievement on the Louisiana state assessments, rather than nationally representative exams.
These results may simply reflect the fact that public schools are operating with curricula that are
already aligned with the state assessments, while private schools have yet to align their curricula.
While we cannot provide an exhaustive examination of the teaching methods of the
private schools in our sample, our testing data allow us to partially examine this question. We
test for a curricular advantage by making use of the fact that some of the Louisiana state
assessments include both criterion-referenced and norm-referenced exam questions. In particular,
while the Louisiana assessments in grades four and eight only include criterion-referenced items,
the iLEAP assessments offered in grades three, five, six, and seven include both criterion- and
norm-referenced exam questions. If public school students experience a disproportionate
curricular advantage, one would expect smaller negative LATE impact estimates on the iLEAP
exams than on the LEAP exams.
Table 7 presents results from models examining the extent to which LSP usage effects
differ across test type. Unlike in our earlier analyses, the results presented in Table 7 focus on the
first year of program participation because we believe the shock of a curricular disadvantage to
be greatest for private schools participating in the first year of the program.
For both ELA and math, we find that students taking the LEAP exam do appear to
perform worse than iLEAP takers; however the estimated differences are statistically
insignificant all cases. While not definitive, this pattern of results suggests that the substantial
negative LATE impact estimates could be partially driven by the stronger alignment of the public
school curricula to the state assessments. At the same time, it is important to note that LSP
scholarship users still performed quite poorly on the hybrid iLEAP exams. Thus, while these
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findings may provide some insight into the substantial magnitude of our estimated impacts, they
nevertheless support the general finding of a negative overall effect of the program after one
year.
Table 7
Estimated effects of LSP usage, iLEAP vs. LEAP test takers after one year
iLEAP Takers

English Language Arts
Mathematics

English Language Arts
Mathematics

LEAP Takers

(1)
(2)
Panel A: Simple Model
-0.14*
-0.24
(0.09)
(0.18)
-0.58***
-0.77***
(0.07)
(0.21)
Panel B: Fully Specified Model
-0.15*
-0.29
(0.08)
(0.20)
-0.59***
-0.79***
(0.09)
(0.21)

Model summary†
N
Risk Sets
First Stage F Statistics
LSP Use
Interaction

Diff.
(3)
0.10
(0.21)
0.19
(0.25)
0.13
(0.22)
0.20
(0.22)

1,538
176
38.54
121.42

*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10
† Model summary is from fully specified math regressions.
Notes. Panel A (Simple Model) presents results of estimations that only control for baseline achievement and risk set
fixed effects. Panel B (Fully Specified Model) additionally controls for student demographics, number of school
preferences offered, and geography. Performance measures standardized within grade based on control group score
distributions. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering within risk sets.
Source. Authors’ calculations.

7. Conclusion
This paper presents an estimation of the effects of the statewide expansion of the Louisiana
Scholarship Program (LSP)—one of the newest and largest school voucher programs in the
U.S—on student achievement after two years. This study contributes to the existing literature on
the participant effects of publicly funded voucher programs for two reasons. First, it uses a
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highly rigorous experimental design to estimate treatment effects while avoiding self-selection
bias concerns. Second, it is among the first evaluations of a statewide school voucher program.
These contributions will add to the existing knowledge on the effects of private school choice
programs.
The results presented in this paper indicate significant and substantial negative
achievement impacts associated with using an LSP scholarship. In general, we find that LSP
scholarship usage is associated with declines of 20 percent of a standard deviation in ELA
achievement and 35 percent of a standard deviation in math, however only the latter finding is
statistically significant. These findings are the first of their kind among random assignment
evaluations of school voucher programs and are robust to several alternative specifications.35
At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that our analyses are based on a small
subsample of LSP participants with performance data on the Louisiana state assessments.
Specifically, our analysis sample represents approximately 20 percent of the 2012 cohort of
eligible applicants. Thus, in a real sense, this paper is not an evaluation of the entire program, but
an evaluation of the experiences of students in grades three through seven at baseline, who
participated in actual lotteries, with testing outcomes in Year 2. The educational impact of the
LSP on the many thousands of program participants who do not satisfy those criteria remains, at
this point, unknown. Readers are encouraged not to draw firm conclusions from this initial
analysis due to the severe threats to external validity posed by those limitations of the sample.
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The estimates are not sensitive to the inclusion of baseline test data (Appendix Table A1). We find similar
relationships when examining science (insignificant negative results) and social studies (significant negative
estimates) (Appendix Table A2). Results do not appear to depend on our definition of what constitutes a lottery
(Appendix Table A3). Finally, we find similar results in a quasi-experimental analysis examining the relationship
between private school attendance and student achievement (Appendix Table A4).
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At this point we can only speculate as to why our results differ so dramatically from the
voucher experiments conducted previously. Specifically, we can offer four explanations that
coincide with the observed findings.
The first explanation deals with the LSP’s scale. As mentioned, this is the first
experimental evaluation of a school voucher program implemented state-wide. In contrast, the
nonsignificant and modestly positive impact estimates associated with earlier programs are
drawn from programs largely serving small samples of students in urban school districts. Among
these studies, the evaluation of the DC Opportunity Scholarship Program (Wolf, et al., 2013) is
the most comparable experimental evaluation of a voucher program in scope and scale. While
Wolf et al. (2013) found large positive attainment effects associated with the DC OSP, they
found modest achievement effects, only observed in reading and largely concentrated among
relatively advantaged students. Moreover, recent non-experimental yet rigorous analysis of a
statewide voucher program in Indiana also reports significant negative achievement effects in the
short-run that decrease in size over time (Waddington & Berends, 2015). Such findings suggest
that the LSP’s scale of implementation may have played a role in the significant negative effect
estimates presented here.
A second explanation lies in the relatively short implementation time frame. The
statewide expansion of the LSP was passed during the end of the 2012 Louisiana State
Legislative Session in June and participating schools did not receive information on their
incoming students until the August of 2012, giving the schools little time to prepare for their new
students. Moreover, participating private schools had only six months to prepare the new
students for the Louisiana state assessments, tests aligned to the state’s standards and to which
the private schools had never before been subject. While we do not find strong evidence that
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private schools faced a curricular disadvantage by being subject to the state’s assessments, the
declining magnitude of the negative effects observed in ELA and math do coincide with an
adjustment period for participating private schools. Moving forward, it will be important to
determine if the negative initial impacts continue to dissipate over time.
A third explanation deals with the pool of students eligible for the LSP. While most of
the earlier voucher programs examined by experimental evaluations focused on serving
disadvantaged sub-populations of students, none of the students in those evaluations were
required to have attended poorly performing public schools as is the case for the LSP. This
additional academic requirement could explain the substantial drop off in performance if
participating private schools were not adequately prepared to serve the needs of students who
were both financially and academically in great need. While the doubly-disadvantaged nature of
LSP participants is a possible explanation for the observed negative effects, it is not a
justification for them. The LSP eligibility requirements are an important design feature of the
program and are reflective of program goals. That participating private schools struggled to meet
the needs of such students in the first year of the state’s implementation suggests the program did
not meet its goals in that first year. The fact that the large achievement gap between the LSP and
control group students after Year 1 had declined somewhat in Year 2, especially in math,
suggests that participating schools successfully adjusted to meet the significant needs of their
new students. As with the earlier explanations, more time is needed to determine the extent to
which the earlier observed negative effects persist in the long run.
Finally, it could be the case that a higher-quality set of private schools participated in
earlier voucher and scholarship programs in Washington, DC; New York City; Dayton, Ohio;
Milwaukee, Wisconsin; and Charlotte, North Carolina; in which more positive voucher
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experimental impacts were reported. Our initial descriptive analysis of data about participating
and non-participating Louisiana private schools generally supports that hypothesis (Mills, Sude
& Wolf, 2015). Less than one-third of the private schools in Louisiana chose to participate in the
LSP in its first year, possibly because of the extensive regulations placed on the program by
government authorities (Kisida, Wolf, & Rhinesmith, 2015) combined with the relatively modest
voucher value relative to private school tuition (Mills, Sude & Wolf, 2015). Although it is only
speculation at this point, the Louisiana Scholarship Program regulatory requirements may have
played a role in preventing the private school choice program from attracting the kinds of private
schools that would deliver better outcomes to its participants.
Nevertheless, while certain aspects of the findings presented here align with each of these
explanations, it is important to recognize that they are, at this point, simply speculations. A
limitation of this research is that our design cannot test these hypotheses conclusively. Instead,
the purpose of this work is to provide the most rigorous assessment of the effect of the program
on student achievement. In this regard, it is clear the LSP has negatively affected the
achievement of the subset of eligible participating LSP students examined here. Most likely,
each of the four explanations offered here played a role in the negative findings we observe.
Additional research, including examination of long-run and non-cognitive effects and qualitative
analyses aimed at understanding the program’s implementation, is needed to help shed light on
the negative achievement findings presented here.
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Appendix
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Figure A1. Comparison of treatment and control group average ELA performance over time.
Achievement has been standardized by grade and year to the Louisiana state test taking
distribution. Dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals for the performance averages.
These results indicate that control group students did experience a mild improvement relative to
the state over time; however treatment group students experienced a large decline in performance
between 2011-12 and 2012-13. By 2013-14, treatment group students appear to have been
making small gains on the control group.
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Figure A2. Comparison of treatment and control group average math performance over time.
Achievement has been standardized by grade and year to the Louisiana state test taking
distribution. Dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals for the performance averages.
These results indicate that control group students did experience a mild improvement relative to
the state over time; however treatment group students experienced a large decline in performance
between 2011-12 and 2012-13. By 2013-14, treatment group students appear to have made small
gains on the control group.
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Table A1
Removing the baseline achievement requirement
Year 1
w/ Baseline No Baseline
Achievement Achievement
Outcome
(1)
(2)
-0.20***
-0.23***
English Language Arts
(0.08)
(0.08)
-0.64***
-0.54***
Mathematics
(0.09)
(0.08)
N
Risk Sets

1,537
176

2,363
258

Year 2
w/ Baseline No Baseline
Achievement Achievement
(3)
(4)
-0.18
-0.21*
(0.12)
(0.11)
-0.34**
-0.53***
(0.14)
(0.15)
1,525
177

2,239
256

*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10
Notes. All models are fully specified. Performance measures standardized within grade based on control group score
distributions. All models include risk set fixed effects. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering within
risk sets.
Source. Authors’ calculations.
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Table A2.
Estimated effects of LSP usage on student achievement after two years, multiple outcomes
LATE Estimates
Outcome
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
English Language Arts
-0.18
-0.18
-0.17
-0.18
(0.12)
(0.12)
(0.11)
(0.12)
Mathematics
-0.32***
-0.33**
-0.33**
-0.34**
(0.11)
(0.16)
(0.14)
(0.14)
Science
-0.16
-0.15
-0.15
-0.16
(0.13)
(0.12)
(0.10)
(0.11)
Social Studies
-0.40***
-0.40***
-0.39**
-0.40***
(0.13)
(0.13)
(0.15)
(0.12)
Controls
Baseline Achievement
X
X
X
X
Demographics
X
X
X
Number of Choices
X
X
New Orleans
X
N
1,525
Risk Sets
177
*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10
Notes. Performance measures standardized within grade based on control group score distributions. All models
include risk set fixed effects. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering within risk sets. First stage Fstatistics all exceed Staiger and Stock’s (1997) recommended threshold of 10.
Source. Authors’ calculations.
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Table A3.
Estimated effects of LSP usage across different lottery specifications
Risk Set Win Percentage
0-100
5-95
10-90
(1)
(2)
(3)
Panel A: Simple Model
-0.18
-0.18
-0.16
English Language Arts
(0.12)
(0.11)
(0.11)
-0.32**
-0.32**
-0.32**
Mathematics
(0.15)
(0.16)
(0.14)

English Language Arts
Mathematics

Panel B: Fully Specified Model
-0.18
-0.18
(0.12)
(0.12)
-0.34*** -0.34***
(0.12)
(0.12)

Model summary*
N
Risk Sets
First Stage
LSP Use
Joint F-statistic

20-80
(4)
-0.19*
(0.11)
-0.25*
(0.13)

-0.18*
(0.09)
-0.35***
(0.13)

-0.22*
(0.12)
-0.30*
(0.17)

1,525
177

1,512
176

1,329
169

919
136

0.49
(0.03)
478.74

0.49
(0.03)
381.22

0.45
(0.02)
534.53

0.50
(0.03)
309.91

*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10
† Model summary is from fully specified math regressions.
Notes. Table examines sensitivity of results to alternative definitions of lotteries that use more restrictive range for
risk set win percentages. Panel A (Simple Model) presents results of estimations that only control for baseline
achievement and risk set fixed effects. Panel B (Fully Specified Model) additionally controls for student
demographics, number of school preferences offered, and geography. Performance measures standardized within
grade based on control group score distributions. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering within risk
sets.
Source. Authors’ calculations.
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Table A4.
Quasi-experimental analysis of private school attendance
Year 1
Simple Model Fully Specified
(1)
(2)
-0.19***
-0.19***
English Language Arts
(0.04)
(0.03)
-0.52***
-0.52***
Mathematics
(0.04)
(0.05)
Model summary
N
R-squared

2,315 – 2,322
0.60 - 0.61

Year 2
Simple Model Fully Specified
(3)
(4)
-0.18***
-0.19***
(0.04)
(0.04)
-0.44***
-0.44***
(0.05)
(0.04)

2,249 – 2,255
0.49 - 0.52

*** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<0.10
Notes. Results are based on OLS models examining the relationship between private school attendance and student
achievement. Performance measures standardized within grade based on the performance of all test takers in the
state of Louisiana in the given year. This differs from our primary analysis, which standardizes performance relative
to the control group test distributions. “Simple Model” refers to estimations that only control for baseline
achievement and risk set fixed effects. “Fully Specified Model” refers to estimations that additionally control for
student demographics, number of school preferences offered, and geography. All models include risk set fixed
effects. Standard errors (parentheses) account for clustering within risk sets.
Source. Authors’ calculations.
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